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2Bayes and health care research
Abstract
Bayes’ rule shows how one might rationally change one’s beliefs in the light of 
evidence.  It is the foundation of a statistical method called Bayesianism.  In health 
care research, Bayesianism has its advocates but the dominant statistical method is 
frequentism.   
 
There are at least two important philosophical differences between these methods.  
First, Bayesianism takes a subjectivist view of probability (i.e. that probability scores 
are statements of subjective belief, not objective fact) whilst frequentism takes an 
objectivist view.  Second, Bayesianism is explicitly inductive (i.e. it shows how we 
may induce views about the world based on partial data from it) whereas frequentism 
is at least compatible with non-inductive views of scientific method, particularly the 
critical realism of Popper.   
 
Popper and others detail significant problems with induction.  Frequentism’s apparent 
ability to avoid these, plus its ability to give a seemingly more scientific and objective 
take on probability, lies behind its philosophical appeal to health care researchers. 
 
However, there are also significant problems with frequentism, particularly its 
inability to assign probability scores to single events.  Popper thus proposed an 
alternative objectivist view of probability, called propensity theory, which he allies to 
a theory of corroboration; but this too has significant problems, in particular, it may 
not successfully avoid induction.  If this is so then Bayesianism might be 
3philosophically the strongest of the statistical approaches.  The article sets out a 
number of its philosophical and methodological attractions.  Finally, it outlines a way 
in which critical realism and Bayesianism might work together. 
Key words
Bayes, Bayesianism, frequentism, critical realism, statistics, Popper, induction, health 
care, research.
4Bayes and health care research
Introduction
In this article I argue that Bayesianism has a positive contribution to make to the 
philosophy and methodology of health care research.  The main philosophical 
contribution is that Bayesianism provides a plausible account of induction.  The main 
methodological contribution is that the use of Bayes’ rule in the interpretation of 
evidence may be preferable to the dominant method of statistics used in health care 
(that of frequentism).  The methodological strengths of Bayesianism have already 
been set out in many articles aimed at health care researchers; this article focuses on 
the philosophical background.   
 
I begin with an outline of Bayesianism method.  I then contrast its philosophical basis 
with that of the dominant statistical method used in health care research, frequentism.  
I suggest that these philosophical differences are partly behind the dominance of 
frequentism.  However, I argue that frequentism has problems of its own and that an 
alternative, related view, Popper’s propensity theory, might retain at least one of these 
problems.  Next I give an account of the philosophical and methodological attractions 
of Bayesianism.  Finally, I outline an account of research method that attempts to 
combine insights from Popper’s critical realist view of science with the Bayesian 
account of induction. 
 
51. Bayes’ rule and Bayesian conditionalization
The following account is drawn from various sources, particularly Hacking (2001), 
Earman (1992), Papineau (1995), Worral (1998), Goodman (1999b) and Spiegelhalter 
et al (2000).  
 
At the heart of Bayesianism is Bayes’ rule (or theorem).  This is a simple and 
uncontroversial element of probability theory.  It is based on the idea that many 
unknown quantities have a probability distribution.  For example, (based on Bland 
and Altman [1998]), the prevalence of diabetes in a region of the UK might be an 
unknown quantity.  However, we may know from other surveys that the prevalence in 
the UK as a whole is around 2% and that the prevalence within a number of areas of 
the UK lies between 1 and 3%.  As a result, it is very unlikely that the prevalence in 
the region of interest would be 0% or 10%.  Conversely, it is very likely to lie 
between, say, 0.5% and 4%.  The probability of these various results could be plotted 
on a graph.  This would resemble a normal, bell-curve distribution, with 2% at its 
apex.  This graph would represent the probability distribution for the unknown 
quantity, prevalence of diabetes in the region. 
 
Suppose that new evidence became available.  1.5% of a survey of 1000 people in the 
region is diabetic.  Bayes’ rule tells us how the probability distribution should alter in 
the light of this evidence.  It states that the posterior probability (i.e. the distribution in 
the light of new evidence) is proportional to the prior probability (i.e. the distribution 
we had before) times the likelihood.  Stated more formally, 
 
Posterior probability of hypothesis  Prior probability x Likelihood 
6The likelihood is a function that tells us how probable the new evidence would be if 
our prior probability were correct.  It can be used in Bayes’ rule to help form the 
posterior probability.  In the diabetes example, the most probable result of the survey 
was 2%.  If this had been the result of the survey then the effect of the new evidence 
mediated through Bayes’ rule would have been to leave the position of the apex of the 
probability distribution unaltered but to increase its height.  In other words, the bell-
curve would have become narrower around the same apex.  As it is, the effect of the 
result showing 1.5% prevalence in the survey of 1000 will be to shift the apex to 
1.7%, i.e. to shift the probability distribution to the left. 
 
Bayes’ rule can be adapted to the more complex position where we are concerned 
with conflicting hypotheses.  For example, we might have a null hypothesis that a 
drug will have no effect on mortality and a hypothesis that it will.  Provided that these 
hypotheses are mutually exhaustive, that is, that no other hypothesis about the case is 
possible, Bayes rule states that, 
 
Posterior probability of hypothesis  Prior probability x Bayes Factor. 
 
And the Bayes factor is, 
 
Likelihood of hypothesis / Likelihood of null hypothesis 
 
This can be adapted to a situation where the hypothesis is being set against a number 
of alternative hypotheses.  Thus Bayes’ rule is one that can be used in the analysis of 
7many types of quantitative data in health care research, from the search for a single 
figure to the comparison of the probability of alternative hypotheses.   
 
This much is uncontroversial.  The controversy lies in the application of Bayes’ rule.  
In particular, there are at least three controversial assumptions underlying its 
application by Bayesians.  The first of these assumptions is that probability is a 
measure of opinion; it is subjective rather than objective.  Bayesians hold that all 
empirical statements about the world are beliefs that we hold to a greater or lesser 
extent.  Therefore, we can assign probability scores to these statements: we assign a 
score close to 1 where we are almost certain that it is true, a score of 0 where we are 
almost certain it is false.  All our beliefs will lie somewhere on this scale. 
 
The other assumptions follow from the first.  They are that statistics is an appropriate 
method for the revision of these subjective beliefs and that Bayes’ rule is an 
appropriate consistent method for doing this.  Different people will assign different 
scores to empirical statements.  For example, some will be almost certain that the 
MMR vaccine is not implicated in autism, others almost certain that it is.  Bayes’ rule 
tells us how we should change our views in the light of evidence.  It can also be 
adapted to situations where we are unsure whether or not the evidence has occurred 
(Howson, 1995).  The process whereby we change our probability beliefs in the light 
of evidence is called conditionalization.  Bayesian method has its advocates in health 
care research but is little used.  The dominant statistical method is frequentism. 
 
2. The philosophical background to Bayesianism and frequentism
This section explores the philosophical differences that are at the heart of the debate 
between Bayesians and frequentists.  Briefly these are that i) Bayesianism is based on 
8a subjective view or probability, frequentism on an objective view; ii) Bayesianism is 
explicitly an inductive method whereas frequentism is, at least, compatible with the 
anti-inductive (critical realist) views of Karl Popper.  Thus, this section also describes 
some of the problems with induction that led to the development of critical realism.  I 
suggest that frequentism’s apparent ability to avoid these problems (as Bayesianism 
cannot) is one of its chief appeals. 
 
2i) Objectivism and subjectivism
Bayesianism takes a subjectivist view of probability.  For subjectivists, a probability 
score is a statement of the strength of a belief.  A statement beginning, “I am 90% 
sure that x” reflects a subjectivist view.  For objectivists, a probability score is a 
statement of fact.  For example, when we say an unbiased coin has a 50% chance of 
turning up heads we are stating a fact about the world.   
 
In the subjectivist approach of Bayesianism the key methodological idea is 
conditionalization (described above).  In the objectivist approach of frequentism the 
key methodological idea is the notion of the long run (or infinite run).  Thus we would 
say that the unbiased coin has a 50% chance of turning up heads because in the long 
or infinite run it would turn up heads 50% of the time.  It follows that if we are to 
make a statement of probability it must be about an event that, at least in principle, is 
repeatable in the long run.  As we shall see, this causes some problems when it comes 
to single event probability. 
 
This philosophical difference between Bayesianism (as subjectivism) and frequentism 
(as objectivism) is reflected in further methodological differences.  Because 
9Bayesians are concerned with beliefs, the starting point of scientific method is the 
beliefs we have now and the finishing point is the beliefs we have in the light of new 
evidence.  As such, prior beliefs are brought into the interpretation of any new data.  
By contrast, frequentists (as objectivists) are not interested in beliefs but only in what 
the data tells us about the world.  As such, they do not use evidence from outside the 
trial in the interpretation of results, although meta-analysis does permit them to add 
data from different trials to get a more precise interpretation. 
 
2ii) Induction and its problems
A second area of philosophical difference between frequentism and Bayesianism 
relates to the use of induction.  Bayesianism is explicitly inductive whereas 
frequentism is compatible with attempts to avoid it.  To explain this it is necessary 
first to set out what induction is and why it might be best avoided in scientific 
method. 
 
Science attempts to gain knowledge through observation, including experiment, and 
through reasoning.  The reasoning it uses can be categorised into two main types, 
induction and deduction. 
 
In deductive reasoning, the conclusion follows from the premises without risk.  In 
other words, provided the premises of the deductive argument are true, and provided 
the argument form is a valid one, the conclusion that follows will be true.  For 
example, if I argue that the cat is on the mat and that the mat is in the house I can 
deduce that, therefore, the cat is in the house.  Deductive reasoning, because it takes 
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no risks, appears to provide no new substantive content; all the information in the 
conclusion is already contained in the premises. 
 
By contrast, inductive reasoning takes risks; it involves moving from data to opinions 
not entailed by the data.  Hacking (2001) describes three types of inductive reasoning. 
i) Sample to population.  For example, we noted that drug x worked for 95% 
of a sample with a disease and we conclude that it will work on around 
95% of the population with the disease. 
ii) Population to sample.  For example, we know that 5% of patients admitted 
to our hospital are Muslim and we conclude that a random sample of 
hospital patients will contain roughly 5% of Muslims. 
iii) Sample x to sample y.  For example, we sample 100 middle-aged men 
attending a screening clinic and note that 80% are middle-class.  We 
conclude that the next hundred that we sample will contain a similar 
proportion. 
This is probably not an exhaustive list.  Richard Lilford (personal communication) 
describes a type of induction where we move from evidence in one area to a 
conclusion in a different one.  For example, our basic knowledge of science allows us 
to induce that homeopathy is unlikely to work, or that vasodilators should not be 
given in cases of aortic stenosis.  (He goes on to say that it is a strength of 
Bayesianism that it is able to accommodate this type of induction).   
 
The information in the conclusions of all pieces of inductive reasoning is new; it does 
not simply follow from the premises.  Furthermore, scientific reasoning appears to 
11
make a great deal of use of such reasoning, as I hope the examples indicate.  
However, such reasoning is risky; it could go wrong.   
 
The problems with using induction in science have been discussed very extensively 
(e.g. Chalmers, 1999; Papineau, 1995; Worral, 1998; O’Hear, 1995; and Ruben, 
1998).  I shall briefly describe four problems. 
 
2ii – a) Hume’s problem. Induction cannot be rationally justified because it is 
based on the assumption that the future will be like the past.  For example, it 
assumes that because apples have fallen downwards in the past they will carry 
on doing so in the future.  However, the only support we can find for this 
assumption is itself dependent upon induction.  In other words, the only reason 
we have to believe that the future will be like the past is because in the past, 
futures have been like the past.  Thus any attempt to justify induction falls foul 
of a vicious circle (Okasha, 2001). 
 
2ii – b) Goodman’s problem. Induction cannot be rationally limited: it is always 
possible to induce conflicting conclusions from the same data.  For example, the 
repeated observation of green emeralds allows us to induce the conclusion that 
all emeralds are green.  However, it also allows us to conclude that all emeralds 
are grue.  Grue is the phenomenon of appearing green until, say, January 2010 
and blue thereafter (Papineau, 1995).  This is sometimes referred to as 
Goodman’s “gruesome” problem or as the problem of projectability (Skyrms, 
2000).   
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2ii – c) The Ravens paradox. Induction can draw upon an absurdly wide range 
of observations to support a hypothesis.  For example, the hypothesis that all 
ravens are black is supported by the repeated observation of black ravens.  
However, it seems to gain equal support from the observation of things that are 
not black and not ravens.  Thus the observation of a white swan supports the 
hypothesis (Ruben, 1998). 
 
2ii – d) The tacking paradox. Induction can use a single observation to support 
an absurdly wide range of hypotheses.  For example, elliptical orbits confirm 
Newton's theory of gravity.  However, it is possible to tack on to Newton's 
theory a further hypothesis, for example, that the planet Pluto is pitted with 
green cheese.  Induction implies that a hypothesis is supported by evidence if 
that evidence is a consequence of the hypothesis.  Because elliptical orbits are 
consequential on the "gravity plus cheese" hypothesis, their existence supports 
that hypothesis (Papineau, 1995). 
 
2iii) Critical realism, objectivism and the rejection of Bayesianism
A key starting point for Popper is his rejection of induction; he believes that it is not 
rationally justified and that science can and does avoid it (Popper, 1992, 1989).  He 
says that science does not proceed by inducing theories and hypotheses from 
evidence.  Rather it proceeds by the method of conjecture and refutation.  From our 
observations of the world and our puzzlement we create explanatory hypotheses.  We 
cannot prove these are true as induction implies, but we can prove that they are false.  
For example, the observation of a single white raven falsifies the hypothesis that all 
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ravens are black.  Popper suggests that it is through making bold conjectures and 
attempting to falsify them that science progresses. 
 
Popper’s critical realism is the chief influence on the method of hypothetico-
deduction that is the framework adopted, consciously or not, by most quantitative 
health-care researchers.  Thus, for example,  
 
“In the 1990s we all believe that we reason under a Popperian hypothetico-
deductive umbrella.” (Vandenbroucke, 1998, p. 15). 
 
Sklar (2000) suggests also that frequentism developed in tandem with critical realism 
in response to perceived problems with subjectivism and Bayesianism.  As a result, 
frequentism and objectivism prima facie sit far better within a Popperian framework 
than does subjectivism.  From this perspective, Bayesianism is subject to a number of 
criticisms. 
 
In the first place, the subjectivism itself is disturbing to those who would like to 
perceive statistical probabilities as more “scientific”.  Bayesianism only tells someone 
how she ought to change her beliefs in the light of evidence, not what those beliefs 
should be.  By contrast, objectivism, in the form of frequentism, seems able to take 
the data and deliver a probability judgement that is valid for all.   
 
Furthermore, Bayesianism is explicitly an inductive method.  As such it is prey to the 
induction problems outlined above.  To these can be added, from a critical realist 
viewpoint, the fact that beliefs cannot be falsified.  As such, Bayesian probabilities are 
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not scientific conjectures.  By contrast, the probability claims of frequentism can be 
subjected to attempts at refutation e.g. by repeating an experiment.  Popper points out 
that repetition of experiments is impossible from a Bayesian perspective.  This is 
because the prior probabilities with which a researcher approaches a second 
experiment will be different to those with which he approached the first one (Popper 
1983).  
 
Thus frequentism’s predominance in health care research is not just a result of the 
methodological problems of shifting to the Bayesian alternative, as Winkler (2001) 
suggests.  Rather, frequentism has been adopted because it is perceived as better in the 
light of a critical realist view of science.  Indeed, one of the pioneers of frequentism, 
R Fisher, took explicitly a critical realist view (Cox, 2001). 
 
However, I shall now argue, first, that objectivism has substantial philosophical 
problems of its own and, second, that Bayesianism is not wholly at odds with an 
adapted form of critical realism (that is, one that is adapted in the light of the need to 
retain some form of induction). 
 
3. Philosophical problems with objectivism in the form of frequentism
In this section I argue that there are significant philosophical problems with 
objectivism as frequentism.  These problems lead Popper to develop a non-frequentist 
but objectivist theory of probability, which is explored in the next section. 
 
One of the most important problems for frequentism is that it seems unable to give an 
account of objective, single event probability.  These are such things as the 
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probability that a large meteorite will strike the earth, or that a 41 year old will suffer 
a heart attack this year.  They play a large part in health care and the application of 
health care research (for example, the question of whether or not a particular person 
would benefit from a particular treatment).  The problem is that such events do not, 
and cannot be imagined to, repeat in a long or infinite run.   
 
Further problems arise from frequentism’s use of the concept of long or infinite runs.   
If we use the idea of a long run then there is the problem of deciding how long is 
enough.  If we use the idea of an infinite run then there is the problem that any 
repeating event in a long run will occur an infinite number of times (Papineau, 1995).   
 
There are standard mathematical techniques for dealing with these problems but 
philosophically there remains unease here.  In particular, this is because any 
probability score is ultimately derived from hypothetical data (i.e. that which belongs 
in the long or infinite run).    Bayesianism is criticised for its use of data from outside 
an experiment in the interpretation of the data from within it.  This is seen as 
prejudicial.  However, frequentism is arguably worse in that it draws upon non-
existent data to derive probabilities from its experimental data.   
 
From a critical realist perspective there is a further concern.  Frequentism appears to 
be inductive.  Induction, as we have seen, uses the assumption that the future will be 
like the past.  The long or infinite run also makes this assumption; it postulates that 
the recurring event seen in our sample will recur in an approximately similar way in 
the future.  This is induction.  This point of itself does not undermine frequentism, but 
it does undermine its claim to a special place in a critical realist approach. 
16
Popper perceived the single event problem as devastating to frequentism; thus, whilst 
he was a frequentist at the time of Logic of Scientific Discovery (first published in 
1934) he had rejected it by 1956 when Realism and the Aim of Science was written.  
He proposed instead a propensity theory of probability.  This is an objectivist but non-
frequentist approach and is described and criticised in the next section. 
 
4. Popper’s propensity theory of probability and its problems
The propensity theory attempts to establish more firmly the idea that probability is a 
fact rooted in the world, not a belief about the world.  Frequentism does this by 
reference to the long or infinite run, with the resultant problems described above.  
Propensity does it by suggesting that a given set of conditions has a propensity to 
produce an event. 
 
Popper gives an example of two dice; one is biased (towards, say, 6), the other fair.  
He imagines an infinite run of the biased die interpolated with a limited number of 
throws of the fair one.  In that long run of throws, he asks, what should we take the 
probability of a 6 to be for any throw of the fair die?  He suggests that on the 
frequentist approach data from the biased die will swamp that from the fair one.  Thus 
the fair-die probability will be the same as for the biased die.  He also suggests that 
this seems wrong; we should want to say that the probability of a 6 would be 1/6.   
 
Popper says this problem can be overcome if we understand probability to be a 
limiting relative frequency only in a sequence of runs under the same experimental 
conditions. Setting this criterion reveals frequency to be a propensity of the 
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experimental conditions to produce a result.  For example, we can say that the 
probability of a particular 40-year-old smoker dying from a heart attack within a year 
is, say, 1 in 1000.  This is based on the experimental conditions  (being male, 40 and a 
smoker) having the propensity to produce that result. 
 
This overcomes at least two of the problems for Popper.  One is that this approach can 
make sense of single event probabilities from an objectivist viewpoint.  A second is 
that such single event probabilities do constitute scientific conjectures in that the 
experimental conditions can be restated as a testable conjecture (e.g. that a sample of 
40-year-old male smokers will die at approximately the rate stated).  However, the 
approach does run into other problems. 
 
One is termed the “reference class problem”.  The probability of our 41-year-old 
smoker dying is a product of putting him into various reference classes based on age, 
sex and smoking habit.  This gives us the particular figure stated.  However, were we 
to add another class, say, that he belongs to a genetically “strong” family of smokers 
none of whom have ever had heart disease, the figure would alter completely.  It 
could be that, given enough information, we would be able to say for certain whether 
or not this man will have a heart attack in the next year.  This “reference class 
problem” suggests that a Bayesian approach to single event probability is, at present, 
the only credible one (see Gillies, 2000 for discussion). 
 
As well as this, there is some doubt as to whether Popper’s propensity approach does 
without induction, as he intends it to.  In particular, a propensity to produce an event 
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under the same experimental conditions is a propensity to do so in the long or infinite 
run – something that I have suggested is an inductive concept.   
 
Popper has been accused of using induction in at least one other area connected to 
probability.  This relates to our tendency to believe that a well-tested hypothesis is 
more probably true than one which whilst not falsified has not yet been subjected to 
testing.  Popper (1983) acknowledges the widespread feeling that a well-tested theory 
is more likely to be true than one that is untested.  He adds that a well-tested theory is 
not necessarily one that has been tested often; rather it is the rigour of the test that is 
important.   
 
The problem for Popper is that this seems to be inductive.  Induction is involved when 
we induce a conclusion wider than that contained in the data (such as a universal 
theory from particular observations).  What seems to happen with well-tested theories 
is that we begin with two particular facts and induce a universal conclusion.  The two 
particular facts are, first, that a particular theory has survived rigorous testing and, 
second, that well-tested theories in the past have been much more reliable than 
untested ones.  The universal conclusion is that well-tested theories are more reliable, 
more probable, than untested ones. 
 
Popper attempts to avoid this inductive manoeuvre through an idea he terms 
“corroboration” (Popper 1983).  He argues that we are easily confused in this area 
because it is idiomatically correct to say that a well-tested theory is more probable 
than an untested one.  As a result we tend to think that testing increases probability 
and that, therefore, induction can be said to have a logic that is set down by the rules 
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and axioms of probability.  This is precisely what Bayesianism does.  However, 
Popper claims this is a mistake.  He identifies a number of problems.  Some of these 
are set out above as problems with induction.  However, Popper suggests there is a 
further problem in that this idiomatic probability does not follow the standard rules of 
probability in a number of ways.  I shall describe two of these. 
 
The first is that, given two well-tested and unfalsified theories we tend to prefer the 
one that has the most content, the one that explains the most.  If the first theory 
explains all that the second one does and more we tend to think it is closer to the truth; 
idiomatically it is more probable.  However, in terms of the rules of probability the 
one with most content is always going to be less probably true.  Take the situation 
where we have two theories, A and B, that explain the same phenomena but where B 
also explains additional phenomena.  Here, A is more probable than B because there 
are more facts that could render B false.  Thus, when we say that theories with greater 
content are more “probable” we are using the term idiomatically, but not in a way that 
follows the rules of probability. 
 
A second way in which idiomatic notions of probability do not follow the standard 
rules of probability is that an unfalsified theory is always going to have a probability 
of 1, or close to 1, because it is verified by unfalsifying evidence all around.  For 
example, the theory that all swans are white is verified by everything that is not white 
and not a swan (this is a version of the Ravens paradox set out above). 
 
Whilst Popper is keen to preserve idiom wherever possible, here he believes the 
confusion is so great that a new term, corroboration, is required.  The key point is that 
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severe testing of theories increases their level of corroboration, not probability.  
Popper claims corroboration can be derived without induction or Bayesian updating 
of probabilities in the light of evidence.   
 
However, the theory has been criticised on a number of fronts (e.g. Rosenkrantz, 
1994).   One problem is that it does still appear inductive.  Popper’s argument, 
outlined in the previous paragraph, shows only that induction may not obey the rules 
of probability in the ways Bayesians claim, not that it does not occur.  Corroboration 
still ultimately seems to rest on some idea that the future will be like the past (i.e. that 
well-tested theories will carry on being reliable).   
 
A second problem is that if we do not invoke induction, the probability of any 
universal theory being true is always zero (a point Popper seems to accept).  However, 
many balk at this conclusion.  As Rosenkrantz (1994, p. 473) puts it,  
 
“Unless we track the changes in our confidence by using Bayes’ rule to 
update inductive probabilities, all unrefuted hypotheses remain equally 
trustworthy and equally testworthy [i.e. there is a] … need to go on testing 
hypotheses no matter how much (putative) inductive support there is to their 
credit.” 
 
Thus, the theory that blood circulates is just as worthy of testing as a far more 
speculative theory, say, that BSE can be passed on through a blood transfusion.  This 
is problematic in itself and suggests a further problem for Popper.  His propensity 
theory of probability required the use of “experimental conditions” to permit us to 
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give single case probability; but if those experimental conditions are invocations of 
unrefuted hypotheses with zero probability then the single case probability will 
always be zero.  Take the case of the 40-year-old smoker discussed above.  The 
probability of his dying in the next year was based upon hypotheses concerning 40-
year-old male smokers as a universal group.  As universal hypotheses, the probability 
of these being true is zero.  Hence, the probability of our 40-year-old smoker dying of 
heart disease is also zero. 
 
I suggest, therefore, that Popper’s theories of propensity probability and of 
corroboration remain problematic.  If the criticisms prove to be correct then some 
form of induction may be inevitable in scientific method.  In such circumstances, 
Bayesianism has a number of attractions.   
 
5. The attractions of Bayesianism
There are both philosophical and methodological attractions to Bayesianism.  The 
philosophical ones include the following. 
 
5i) Single event probability. Bayesianism has no problem with single event 
probability.  Asked to judge, say, the probability of a 40-year-old male smoker having 
a heart attack within the next year the Bayesian can invoke prior probabilities to 
deliver a result.  Given further evidence, such as the genetic “strength” of the man, the 
Bayesian can modify that result. 
 
5ii) Good account of induction. In so far as induction is necessary in the development 
and assessment of science (pace Popper) then, as Earman (1992, p.2) puts it, 
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"Bayesianism is the only view presently in the offing that holds out the hope 
for a comprehensive and unified treatment of inductive reasoning." 
 
Bayesianism explicitly uses induction and has several counters to the problems of 
induction.  I shall briefly describe some of these. 
 
1. Hume’s problem.  Hume tells us that inductive inference cannot be 
justified because it depends upon the assumption that the future will be like 
the past, an assumption that is itself an inductive inference.  However, a 
Bayesian does not depend on this assumption (Okasha, 2001).  Bayes’ rule 
tells us how we should change our beliefs on the basis of data: it does not 
depend on the world being arranged in a certain way.  In particular, it 
permits fallibility: the beliefs we hold are conjectural and subject to change.  
The future may not turn out to be like the past, but Bayes’ rule will allow our 
beliefs to shift accordingly in the light of the evidence.  Okasha (2001) 
suggests that not only does this evade Hume’s problem, it also provides a 
more accurate account of how our beliefs develop in the light of evidence. 
 
2. Goodman’s problem.  Goodman himself suggested one solution to the 
problem on to which Sklar (2000) puts a Bayesian interpretation.  Earman 
(1992) posits his own Bayesian solution, as does Good (1975).  Essentially, 
Earman’s solution draws on the notion of the "washing out" of a hypothesis 
by the accumulation of evidence.  As evidence accumulates, the probability 
of the hypothesis "emeralds are grue” diminishes (for example, as other 
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time-dependent notions like grue fall by the wayside when they fail to 
eventuate).  This idea of "washing out" would work equally with less bizarre 
hypotheses.   
 
3.  The Ravens paradox.  This is fairly easily dealt with using Bayes’ rule.  
Evidence confirms a hypothesis to the extent that it is likely given the 
hypothesis and unlikely otherwise.  Thus observing a white swan does not 
confirm the black ravens hypothesis because it is evidence that is likely 
whether or not the hypothesis is true (Earman, 1992). 
 
4.  The tacking paradox.  The problem here is that evidence that confirms 
one theory can also confirm that theory plus an element tacked onto it.  For 
example, elliptical orbits confirm Newton's gravity theory but also that 
theory plus the hypothesis that Pluto is pitted with cheese.  Papineau (1995) 
says that a Bayesian can challenge the inductive assumption that occurrence 
of the consequences of a theory confirms the theory itself.  Theories do not 
have to be understood holistically.  A Bayesian approach allows for 
evidence supporting elements of a theory to different degrees.  In the 
example here, the Pluto and cheese element is not confirmed at all by 
elliptical orbits.   
 
Bayesianism’s ability to deal with some of these induction problems lies behind 
Earman’s statement at the beginning of this section.  It is not without problems, 
including some of those developed by Popper, but it is a philosophically promising 
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account of induction.  There are also methodological reasons for a health care 
researcher to find Bayesianism attractive; I turn to these next.  
 
5iii) Explicit use of external data. Bayesians are explicit in the use of data from 
outside a trial in the interpretation of results; frequentists use it implicitly and, 
therefore, less clearly.  All research brings with it a huge amount of background belief 
when results are interpreted.  For example, faced with a statistically significant 
relationship between aspirin and deep vein thrombosis the frequentist will be likely to 
conclude there is reason to believe the hypothesis of a relationship.  By contrast, faced 
with a statistically significant relationship between a homeopathic remedy and deep 
vein thrombosis the conclusion is likely to be far more cautious; that this is probably 
statistical artefact and that further research is required (Linde et al, 1997).  Thus in 
interpreting the results, the researcher has brought in prior beliefs about biological 
plausibility. 
 
There are many other ways in which prior beliefs find their way in to frequentist 
analysis.  One simple one is in setting the level at which results are taken to be 
significant.  The selection of, for example, P < 0.05 is based on a value judgment that 
this level of error is acceptable (Goodman, 1991a).  Thus, frequentism’s desire to base 
probability statements on data alone does not succeed.   
 
A frequentist could respond that the problem arises only when people misuse or 
misunderstand statistics.  For example, faced with 95% confidence intervals, or P < 
0.05, they falsely conclude that they can be 95% sure that the null hypothesis is false.  
In reality, frequentists know that it is necessary to draw on other background 
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knowledge, such as the plausibility of the mechanism, before deciding what they 
should believe in the light of results.  A good frequentist will not draw conclusions 
only from the results of one study.  The Bayesian response to this is that their method 
is superior because it closes this gap between results and belief.  Faced with the 
results of a study a Bayesian can say what your posterior belief should be given your 
prior one.  This links to the next point, that Bayesianism is intuitively better.   
 
5iv) Bayesianism is intuitively better. Bayesians point out that frequentism is often 
misunderstood (Goodman, 1999a).   Whilst frequentism can respond in the way just 
described, the tendency to misunderstand suggests that the Bayesian reading of 
statistics fits the way people usually do read them.  For example, each piece of 
epidemiological evidence on MMR and autism is taken to ratchet up our belief of no 
association rather than to be conclusive in itself.  Bayesians believe this is the right 
way to view probabilities and evidence, but it is not frequentism’s way.  Thus 
Bayesianism fits our “natural” way of understanding probability better than does 
frequentism (Gurrin, et al 2000; Winkler, 2001). 
 
There is a further way in which Bayesianism “fits” thinking in health care.  Bayesian 
reasoning is commonplace in diagnostic thinking (see Wulff and Gøtzche, 2000: 
chapter 4).  The clinician is used to taking each diagnostic test result, its specificity 
and sensitivity, and assessing the probability that a given patient has a given disease.  
This is Bayesian in at least two ways.  First, the probability is a subjective one that 
rises and falls with each piece of evidence.  Second, the probability is a single event 
probability, that for a particular person at a particular time. 
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5v) Frequentism wrongly dichotomises results into the significant and the non-
significant. This leads to two possible errors (Goodman, 1999a).  The first is that 
results that are non-significant are completely ignored or discarded.  Thus a result 
might indicate a strong trend that Bayesian analysis would cause to change our 
(posterior) beliefs a little but which has no effect from a frequentist point of view.  
The second is that statistically significant results are taken to be true and we are 
required to act upon them.  Lilford and Braunholtz (1996) show how this can have 
adverse consequences in health policy.  The finding of significant relationships 
between, for example, the pill and thrombosis in one piece of research is taken to be 
conclusive and something that requires immediate action.  In Bayesian terms it would 
be taken as something that alters our posterior beliefs without necessarily doing so 
enough to require immediate action.   
 
These two points, concerning intuition and the false dichotomies of frequentism, show 
an overall advantage of Bayesianism; that it does justice to uncertainty.  Usually one 
piece of research is not conclusive.  It would be far better if we understood evidence 
to ratchet our beliefs in a certain direction. 
 
5vi) P-values greatly overestimate the strength of evidence against the null 
hypothesis. Given fairly plausible assumptions a set of results with P = 0.05 is 
compatible with a situation where nearly half the studies have a true null hypothesis 
(Sterne and Smith, 2001).  Goodman (2001b) shows that the Bayes factor gives a 
much better indication of the strength of evidence against the null hypothesis. 
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5vii) Bayesianism can draw on a wider range of research. Frequentism can only be 
applied with quantitative research.  It is to frequentism that we owe the notion that the 
randomised controlled trial is the gold standard in research because it attends 
exclusively to the data and is unaffected by prejudicial prior beliefs.  Qualitative 
research is seen as being at best a different, unrelated and inferior discipline.  The 
findings of the two types of research cannot be combined. 
 
By contrast, Bayesianism can draw on a wide range of data.  Lilford and Braunholtz 
(2003) give an example.  It involves research into the question of whether school-
based training in the management our social encounters can reduce unwanted 
pregnancies and sexually transmitted diseases.  In this context, beliefs can be 
ratcheted up by a series of qualitative and quantitative studies.  A "real life" example 
of the two types of research being combined is that of Roberts et al (2003).  This 
ability to combine the two types of research will be appealing to health care 
researchers in the qualitative arena. 
 
A related strength of Bayesianism is that it is able to extract meaning from incomplete 
data, such as a small trial.  This is particularly important where one is researching rare 
diseases.  In such cases, frequentist methods require the use of sample sizes, to detect 
evidence of effect, that are unobtainable.  By contrast, Bayesian methods are able to 
show the shift in posterior belief that is appropriate given data from a small trial for a 
range of prior beliefs (Lilford and Braunholtz, 1995) 
 
Winkler (2001) suggests that this apparent strength of Bayesianism is also one of its 
problems in terms of acceptance in health care research.  He suggests that the need to 
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think carefully about inputs into prior probabilities makes the Bayesian approach 
harder to use than frequentism.  Whilst he goes on to suggest ways of making this as 
easy as possible, he says that ultimately, “Hard decision-making problems … deserve 
serious thought” (p. 61). 
 
A frequentist might respond that in the practical choice situation it is possible to draw 
upon other factors, such as background knowledge.  Thus, although frequentism does 
not explicitly factor in the findings of qualitative research into the interpretation of its 
results, it is possible for them to use such things in the application of results.  For 
example, a frequentist study’s result on the likely success rate of radical mastectomy 
versus lumpectomy could be combined with qualitative research in deciding which 
should be provided.  However, this response does not address the key point at issue, 
which is not what should we do but what we should believe.  Bayesians are able to 
draw on the results of different types of study in the interpretation of the results of a 
specific study; this is something frequentism cannot explicitly do. 
 
Some of the methodological problems with frequentism can be corrected; Sterne and 
Smith (2001) offer some very useful guidelines to interpreting research in a way that 
is frequentist but which avoids some of the problems.  Nonetheless, there seem to be 
strong methodological grounds to add to the philosophical grounds for considering a 
move to the wider use of Bayesian methods in health care research.   
 
However, one barrier to this is the influence of critical realism in this area, 
particularly in the form of the hypothetico-deductive method and the key role played 
by attempts to disprove one’s hypothesis (and prove the null one).  A number of 
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writers have suggested that some form of combination of Bayesianism and critical 
realism might be possible (e.g. O’Hear, 1980; Good, 1975).  In the next and final 
section I give an outline of how this might be done. 
 
6. Bayesianism plus critical realism
Bayesianism and critical realism share at least two important beliefs.  The first is that 
humans are fallible and that scientific theories are fallible conjectures.  In 
Bayesianism this is expressed through the idea that hypotheses or conjectures have a 
level of probability based on the evidence, and that this is never, or very rarely, equal 
to 1.  In critical realism it is expressed through the idea that all (universal) hypotheses 
or conjectures have a probability of zero, but that well-tested theories are corroborated 
to a greater or lesser extent. 
 
The second shared belief is that the starting point of scientific inquiry is theory-laden.  
Popper’s refutation of logical positivism used this point.  The positivists believed that 
a non-analytic statement would be meaningful only if there were some (pure) 
observation statement by which ultimately it could be justified.  Popper argued that 
there are no such pure observation statements.  What we observe is the result not just 
of what is “out there” in the world but also of our beliefs and conjectures about the 
world.  Even a very simple observation statement such as “The sky is blue” has 
underlying it hypotheses such as that human eyes reliably report the colour of the sky, 
and the metaphysical hypothesis that there exists an external world. 
 
This argument proved fatal to logical positivism.  Popper’s account of scientific 
method (set out above) thus discards the positivist idea that science progresses from 
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observation to the induction of universal theories and then through to the application 
of those theories in, for example, predicting future events.  Instead the scientist 
proceeds from an initial theoretical position, through conjecture and testing to a new 
theoretical position.  In Bayesianism an almost identical route is followed.  The 
scientist begins from an initial theoretical position reflected in his prior probabilities, 
through experimentation and observation to a new theoretical position reflected in his 
posterior probabilities.   
 
That critical realism shares these central beliefs with Bayesianism lies behind 
O’Hear’s (1980, p.43)  statement that,  
 
“[An] inductive Popperian might be rather similar to a Bayesian.” 
 
There are, as we have seen, disjunctions between the two theories and Popper was 
irredeemably hostile to Bayesianism.  The Bayesian, Okasha (2001) suggests that 
Popper’s non-inductive account of science contains two elements, one plausible and 
the other not.  The plausible element is that scientific theories are the product of 
conjecture rather than inductive inference.  The implausible element is that scientists 
can only attempt to falsify these conjectures rather than prove them, and that this is 
what (good) scientists try to do: science consists only of unfalsified hypotheses; no 
theories are taken to be true, or very probably true.  Okasha disagrees: scientists 
clearly try to prove their conjectures rather than falsify them.  Furthermore, it is clear 
that some theories are taken to be highly probable (e.g. the theory that the heart 
pumps blood round the body). 
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On this basis, the following is a tentative suggestion of the view of scientific 
methodology that would result from putting together Popper and Bayes.  I shall 
suggest four main stages. 
 
Stage one.  The scientist begins with problems and questions.  These may be problems 
of inadequate knowledge – for example, we see apples fall, or pressure sores form, 
but don’t know why.  Or they may be problems of conflicting theories – for example, 
we don’t know whether human behaviour is due primarily to our genetic or our social 
inheritance.   
 
Stage two.  The scientist conjectures trial solutions or hypotheses that explain the 
phenomena or resolve the conflict. 
 
Stage three.  The scientist subjects these conjectures to rigorous testing.  For Popper, 
this testing is aimed solely at falsifying the conjectures.  For a Bayesian, the aim is to 
find the evidence most likely to increase our posterior confidence in the probability of 
the conjecture being true.  However, in practice, the Popperian and Bayesian will be 
looking for the same thing.  This is because the most confirmatory evidence from a 
Bayesian standpoint is that which is most likely if the hypothesis is true and unlikely 
if it is false.  Thus, if the hypothesis is false, looking for the most confirmatory 
evidence is also the best way to falsify it (Jeffrey, 1975).   
 
Stage four.  A new theoretical position is reached.  For Popper, we shall either have 
falsified the hypothesis or not.  If we have not falsified it, we may add it to all the 
other unfalsified conjectures in our theoretical framework.  But note that we cannot 
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say we have increased likelihood of the hypothesis being true.  No matter how many 
attempts at falsification a conjecture survives all we can say is that it is not falsified, 
not that it is probably true. 
 
For a Bayesian it is unlikely that we can reach the stage where we are certain that a 
hypothesis is true or false, but we will be able to say that we have increased or 
decreased our belief in its probability.  If the test has been rigorous and the hypothesis 
has survived then our shift in belief will be substantial. 
 
This is a simple pen portrait of scientific method.  What it suggests is that 
Bayesianism can be introduced into a Popperian framework, adding the element of 
induction that might be necessary if Popper’s propensity theory of probability and his 
theory of corroboration were not successful.   
 
One practical point needs addressing: what should the researcher do when s/he wishes 
to present results to, say, the readers of the BMJ? In the first place, there have already 
been a number of papers published that have used Bayesian analysis alone (e.g. Linde 
et al, 1997; Roberts et al, 2002).  Furthermore, at least one journal has made attempts 
to attract Bayesian papers (Davidoff, 1999).  There are also numerous articles that 
explain Bayesianism (e.g. Goodman, 1999b).  As such, the use of Bayesian analysis 
alone in papers submitted to medical journals would seem a reasonable course of 
action for those convinced of its efficacy.  Conventional analysis alongside might be 
appropriate, however, in this period when we have, in effect, two systems running.  
This would be helpful both as an aid to those unfamiliar with one or the other system 
and also as an illustration of the practicability of Bayesianism.  
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Conclusion
I have tried to show both methodological and philosophical reasons for considering 
the use of Bayesianism in health care research.  Philosophically, Bayesianism is a 
subjectivist account of probability that can be set against the objectivist accounts of 
frequentism and of propensity theory.  Section 3 set out some objections to 
objectivism in the form of frequentism. 
 
Section 4 considered Popper’s alternative objectivist theory of probability, propensity 
theory and identified problems with it.  To these can be added the general question of 
whether Popper is successful in ridding science of the need for induction (through 
both his propensity theory and his theory of corroboration).  I suggested that if he is 
not successful then Bayesianism offers the best hope for an account of the use of 
induction in science that is compatible with the major insights of critical realism. 
 
Much of the argument in this article has focused on the philosophical reasons to 
consider Bayesianism in health care research.  I have done this, at least in part, 
because this area seems to have been neglected in the health care literature advocating 
Bayesianism.  Thus, I have described some methodological reasons to preferring 
Bayesianism over frequentism in health care research, but these are given in far 
greater detail elsewhere (e.g. Spiegelhalter et al, 2000; O’Hagan, Luce 2003).  It is to 
these texts also that the reader should look for discussion of the practicality of the use 
of Bayesianism in health care research.  My general conclusion is that taking together 
the methodological and philosophical argument, Bayesianism can make a positive 
contribution to health care research. 
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